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COPYRIGHT-LIKE PROTECTION FOR DESIGNS 
Ralph S. Brownt 
I. INTRODUCfION 
For many decades, the preferred route to protection against imitators 
of original designs has been a variation of the protection of the law of copy-
right. Many participants and observers,. both interested and disinterested, 
believe that design is under-protected. Congress, however, has yet to be per-
suaded that additional protection is needed. 
This Article reviews the quest for copyright-like protection of designs. 
This quest falls into two uneven time spans. One stretches from before the 
1930sl-more intensely from 1957-through 1983. Every Congress, since 
the 85th in 1957,2 has witnessed the introduction of a bill to protect the 
ornamental designs of useful articles. These bills have passed the Senate 
five times3 but have never received favorable treatment in the House. The 
second time span is just a blink from 1985, when the perennial bill came to 
be titled "Industrial Designs of Useful Articles,'''' and a significant shift of 
emphasis occurred. This Article considers whether this changeling has any 
better chance of passage than its predecessors, and further, whether as a 
matter of public policy, it should become law. 
II. OTHER ROADS TO PROTECTION 
Before analyzing the two copyright-like versions of design protection, 
it would be useful to survey the alternatives to a new form of protection, and 
discuss briefly why certain roads are not taken, or, if they are, why they 
appear to come to a dead end. The discussion will focus particularly on 
design patent, copyright, trademark and trade dress, and misappropria-
tion.5 
t B.A., 1935, Yale College; LL.B., 1939, Yale Law School. Simeon E. Baldin Professor, 
Emeritus, Yale Law School; Adjunct Professor, New York Law School. 
1. For a history of design legislation, see a valuable publication produced by the Copyright 
Office: BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DEsIGN PROTECTION (1955 & Supp. 1959, 1976). The most 
penetrating of the American scholarly writings on design protection are Professor J.H. 
Reichman's massive articles: Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: 
The United States Experience in a Transactional Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6 
(1989); Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the 
Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1143 [hereinafter 
Reichman, Design Protection in Copyright Law); Reichman, Design Protection After the 
Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. Copy. 
RIGHT SOC'y 267 (1984). 
2. During the 85th Congress in 1957, the Willis bill, H.R. 8873, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1957), was introduced. For further discussion of these bills, see generally Brown, 
Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1987) [hereinafter Brown, 
Overview). 
3. See Brown, Overview, supra note 2, at 1395. 
4. H.R. 1900, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
5. For an extensive discussion of each of these areas of the' law, see generally Brown, Over-
view, supra note 2. 
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A. Design Patents 
Upon initial consideration, design patent would seem to be a precise 
and effective method of design protection. Particularly, section 171 of the 
Patent Act states: . "Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental 
design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor.,,6 
Well known, however, are the difficulties of ,obtaining and enforcing 
design patents.7 The main problem is that the design must display inven-
tiveness; it must be nonobvious. These requirements are incorporated 
through section 171, which states that "[tJhe provisions of this title relating 
to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as other-
wise provided."s 
For a time, the burden on those persons applying for design patents was 
somewhat lighter. In an attempt to make design patents more accessible, 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), guided by Judge Giles 
Rich, held in 1966 that inventiveness was to be tested by the eyes ofthe ordi-
nary observer, rather than by the statutory construct of "a person having 
ordinary skill in this art. ,,9 By 1981, however, three' or four federal circuits 
had rejected the "ordinary observer" test and adhered to one based on the 
"ordinary designer.,,10 The CCPA on the eve of its metamorphosis to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, followed the lead of those circuits, 
and adopted the "ordinary designer" test, with a rueful concurrence by 
Judge Rich. In In re Nalbandian, II the CCPA held that "[iJn design cases 
we will consider the fictitious person identified in section 103 as 'one of 
ordinary skill in the art' to be the designer of ordinary capability who 
designs articles of the type presented in the application."12 
The significance of the use of the "ordinary designer" test is not read-
ily apparent either in judicial review by the Federal Circuit, or in the exam-
ining and review standards of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). In 
any event, the statutory standard requiring nonobviousness now appears 
judicially riveted into place, and there is no movement of which I am aware 
for any congressional modification of that standard with regard to design 
patents. This lack of movement may reflect a resigned acceptance that it is 
6. 35 U.S.c. § 171 (1988). 
7. See. e.g., Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality? 20 Years of 
Design Patent Litigation Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., and Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 10 OKLo\. CITY u.L. REV. 195 (1985). 
8. 35 U.S.c. § 171 (1988). The nonobviousness requirement comes from 35 U.S.c. § 103 
(1988). 
9. In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
10. See Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Prods., Inc., 597 F.2d 210 
(10th Cir. 1979); Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.); cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972); Fields v. Schuyler, 472 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
395 U.S~ 909 (1969). 
II. 661 F.2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
12.ld.atI216. 
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not the nonobvious requirement that makes design patents unpopular; it is, 
rather, the patent process itself. The requirement that the PTO search the 
prior art, and make a judgment regarding obviousness and novelty makes 
the process inescapably tedious and expensive. Despite strenuous efforts in 
recent times to surmount the backlog and accelerate the search process, it 
still can take eighteen months to two years before a design patent is 
approved or denied. In addition, substantial application and lawyers' fees 
must be paid. It is not difficult to envision, therefore, why designers yearn 
for a system that combines low search costs and high speed. 13 
B. Copyrights 
C0p,Yright appears to meet the goals of convenience lacking in design 
patents; 4 it is cheap and expeditious. In fact, there was a time some 
thirty-five years ago, during the immediate aftermath of Mazer v. Stein, 15 
when copyright seemed hospitable to artistic design. Mazer held that the 
intended use of a Balinese figure as a lamp base did not preclude copyright 
in the figure. Initially, the Copyright Office supported such an outcome in 
its amicus brief, and further encouraged the Court to legitimize a supposed 
Copyright Office practice of registering artistic objects having utilitarian 
applications. 
The ink was hardly dry on Mazer before the Copyright Office began to 
backtrack. It was inundated with useful objects claiming artistic shapes. 16 
Although amended regulations l7 created no barrier to commercial use or 
mass production of qualifying works, they succeeded in disqualifying the 
shapes of most useful articles, except for features "such as artistic sculpture, 
carving, or pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and 
are capable of existing independently as a work of art.,,18 The "separability 
test" arising from the amended regulations was upheld in Esquire. Inc. v. 
Ringer,19 where the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia determined 
that the denial of a copyright for lighting fixtures whose form followed their 
function was proper. 
The separability test was ultimately incorporated into the 1976 General 
13. See Fryer. Industrial Design Protection in the United States of America-Present Situation 
and Plans for Revision, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 198 (1989) [hereinafter Fryer. Industrial 
Design]. 
14. See generally Denicola. Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to 
Copyright in Useful Articles. 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983). 
15. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
16. See Design Protection: Hearing on S. 2075 and S. 2852 Before the Senate Subcomm. on 
Patents. Trademarks. and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary. 86th Congo 2d Sess. 
1,58-59 (1960) [hereinafter 1960 Hearing] (testimony of Register of Copyrights Arthur 
Fisher). 
17. See Brown, Overview, supra note 2. at 1345. 
18. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1O(c) (1959). 
19. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (setting forth relevant regulations). cert. denied. 440 U.S. 
908 (1979). 
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Revision as part of the definition in section 10 I of "[p lictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works.,,2o Nonetheless, modern design sometimes escapes the 
separability restrictions by being deemed "conceptually" separable even 
though not physically separable. The most successful escape artist was 
Barry Kieselstein-Cord with his belt-buckles. 21 The Second Circuit, how-
ever, over dissents in two other leading cases, has refused to find separabil-
ity in mannequins22 and in a bicycle rack made of bent piping of undenied 
sculptural origin. 23 
Conceptual separability still may have a brighter future, although 
scarcely anyone argues that it should encompass the whole field of design of 
useful articles. 24 To say that because one can imagine the shape of an arti-
cle independently of the article's utility, the article can be copyrighted, 
would extend the copyright monopoly to a myriad of articles, without any-
one's having tested whether the article's utility is either novel or inventive in 
origin. 
C. Trademarks and Trade Dress 
Trademark and trade dress law afford an expanding but incomplete 
protection for designers. A distinctive trademark applied to a distinctive 
design will, if functioning as their proponents say they will, attract buyers to 
the trademarked product. 25 Trademarks do not prevent others from copying 
a design; all the imitator must do is put a distinctive brand name on the 
product. Associating a designer with a design through a trademark or trade 
name is so familiar that we perhaps underrate the efficacy of trademarks. If 
one cannot endlessly intone a famous designer's mark, like Ralph Lauren, 
one can still emphasize a source as "the original" or "the authentic." 
Unfair competition law, in its classic mission to prevent an imitator 
from passing off his goods as those of an originator, is of little direct use to a 
designer. An offended designer, or in many cases, the producer of the 
designed ~rticle, cannot directly prevent copying if she is not protected by a 
utility patent, design patent, or copyright. Indeed, there is weighty public 
policy that undergirds the privilege to copy. 26 
'" 
20. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988). 
21. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989,995 (2d Cir. 1980) (illus-
trating design severability). 
22. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(illustrations). 
23. 8randir Inn, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (illustra-
tions). 
24. But cJ I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01(8)[3), at 2-96.5 
(1986) (accepting copyright in "a myriad of industrial forms" until design legislation 
comes to being). 
25. See 1 1. GILSON, TRADEMARK PRACTICE AND PROTECTION ch. I (1988); I 1. McCARTHY, 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION ch. 3 (1984). 
26. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-48 (1989). 
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Still an artful marketer can protect the actual shape and appearance of 
a product by taking two affirmative positions and one defensive posture. 
First, the marketer must show that the buying public associates the appear-
ance of her product with a single source. This step is called (or rather mis-
called) the creation and recognition of secondary meaning. Next, the mar-
keter must persuade a court that the imitator's copying creates a likelihood 
of confusion among customers, although it is not necessary that the mar-
keter prove actual confusion. Likelihood of confusion is sufficient, and 
often can be inferred from the notion that the imitator's motive in copying is 
to create confusion. Finally, the marketer will very likely have to defeat a 
charge by the imitator that the design is not entitled to protection because it 
is functional. 27 
Currently, a popular definition of "functionality" embraces the concept 
that "a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of 
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.,,28 Several deci-
sions emphasize the "essentiality" portion of the definition. 29 Indeed, it is 
fairly easy to prove that a design feature is not essential, and as such, not 
functional. In a recent Second Circuit case regarding a bicycle rack made 
by bending pipe so that it became a string of U's and inverted U's, the court 
determined that a copyright would not satisfy conceptual separability of 
design from function. 30 Yet in the next breath, Judge Oakes strongly 
encouraged an unfair competition count, and declared that there were many 
ways to prop up a bicycle, including trees and fire hydrants.31 
To what extent design protection can coexist with the functional work-
ing of a useful article i~, of course, a central problem in the copyright-like 
approach. With regard to the applicability of unfair competition in trade 
dress, it is enough to say that counter-charges that a design is too functional 
can be defeated. 
The favored channel for condemning appearance copying as unfair 
competition is section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act (Lanham Act). 
That section was recently embellished, and perhaps strengthened, by 
amendments made in 1988,32 even though it was strong enough before it 
was amended. Section 43(a)'s basic condemnation of any false representa-
tions of origin is a commerce clause-based federal statute and runs free of 
the preemptive power of the Copyright Act on state law. 33 The Lanham Act 
is also immune from the submission of the states to federal patent and 
27. For a more detailed discussion of unfair competition as it applies to design protection, 
see generally Brown, Overview, supra note 2. 
28. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 US. 844,850 n.IO (1982). 
29. See. e.g., LeSportsac,lnc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985) (a functional fea-
ture is one that is essential to the use or purpose of the article). 
30. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987). 
31. [d. at 1148 n.5. 
32. 15 US.c. § 1125(a) (1988). 
33. 17 US.C. § 301 (1988). Federal legislation avoids preemption by virtue of § 301 (d). 
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copyright policies associated with the decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
StiJfel CO. 34 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting CO. 35 
D. Misappropriation 
Misappropriation-the weakest of the four weapons against imi~a­
tors-emanates from classic unfair competition law, with its roots in con-
sumer confusion, and the policies behind the doctrine. The classic example 
of the application of the doctrine of misappropriation is found in the previ-
ously discredited, but recently rehabilitated, International News Service v. 
Associated Press decision. 36 In that case, the Associated Press (AP) 
asserted that the International News Service (INS), which was barred from 
the European war zone in 1916, copied AP's news reports, and misappropri-
ated the fruits of AP's labors. The Supreme Court agreed. 
The product of a designer is an end similar to AP's news reports in that 
the designer spends both time and effort on the creation and promotion of a 
design. The imitator, on the other hand, takes the benefits of the popular 
design without bearing the burdens of its creation. The misappropriation 
remedy has powerful equitable appeal, and churns along in subterranean 
ways, occasionally surfacing in recognized legal ch~nnels. 
This equitable argument for turning an intangible interest into a prop-
erty right has been kept in check by the coolness with which law has histori-
cally treated its impulsive sibling, equity. As a matter of positive law, the 
system usually dismisses complaints of misappropriation in this wise: 
inventions, writings, and designs are all public goods, as they are not con-
sumed by use; only the legislature can create rights in intangibles like 
design. Although the Constitution does permit the creation of exclusive 
rights in writings and discoveries, Congress enjoys the ultimate power over 
the creation of those rights, and the states may act only on matters which 
Congress has left unattended. 37 
Courts sometimes get carried away by their own rhetoric, and pro-
claim, for example, that 
34. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
35. 376 u.s. 234 (1964). For a vigorous endorsement of § 43(a) as the preferred channel of 
protecting designs, see Dratler, Trademark Protection of Industrial Designs. 1988 U. ILL. 
L. REV, 887. 
36. International News Servo v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). International News 
Service, which Judge Learned Hand tried to read almost out of existence, see Cheney 
Bros. V. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), recently was quoted by the 
Supreme Court in Carpenter V. United States. 484 U.S. 19,26 (1987), as supporting the 
Wall Street Journal's property right in unpublished material that an employee used for 
illicit securities trading. Prior to that time, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had pro-
claimed, in a record piracy case, "I.N.S. stands." Mercury Record Prods., Inc. v. Eco-
nomic Consultants, Inc .• 64 Wis. 2d 163, 182, 218 N.W.2d 705, 714 (1974). cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 914 (1975). . 
37. Goldstein V. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
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the law of unfair competition does not rest solely on the ground of 
direct competitive injury, but on the broader principle that prop-
erty rights of commercial value are to be and will be protected 
from any form of unfair invasion or infringement and from any 
form of commercial immorality, and a court of equity will pene-
trate and restrain every guise resorted to by the wrongdoer. 38 
The actual application of such exuberance is infrequent. In fact, the 
tort of misappropriation remains amorphous, and designers cannot reason-
ably depend upon the willingness of courts to fashion remedies without leg-
islative guidance. 39 
So we now turn to an examination of the two statutory models, the 
long-lived. bill for the protection of "ornamental designs of useful arti-
cles, ,,40 and the recent variant that speaks to "industrial designs of useful 
articles. ,,41 
III. "ORNAMENTAL" OR "INDUSTRIAL"? WHAT IS THE REAL 
DIFFERENCE? 
A fundamental question about any proposed design legislation is: 
"What does it protect?" That question is welded to one equally fundamen-
tal: "What should it protect?" Working through these questions requires 
attention to both the standards and reach of the closely related systems of 
design patent and copyright. Once a pattern which is substantively harmo-
nious with those systems is achieved, it will remain to be seen whether they 
will mesh with each other in operation. An additional issue that must be 
addressed is whether a designer may take advantage of more than one sys-
tem of protection. 
The mechanics of design protection are neither controversial nor of any 
great interest. They are adapted from copyright, the main variation being 
that design protection does not become effective until registration.42 
38. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 
N.Y.S.2d 483,493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950), affd per curiam, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 
795 (1951). 
39. The preemptive power of Congress was recently underscored by the unanimous decision 
of the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 
(1989), where the Court struck down statutes in a dozen states which attempted to make 
actionable direct molding ("plug" molding), which is the use of an original manufac-
tured object to make a mold from which copies are then made. The decision strongly 
reaffirms the teachings of Sears and Compeo, and makes it quite clear that, with respect 
to designs of useful objects, state law is effectively limited to preventing consumer con-
fusion. 
40. S. 22, 94th Cong .• 20 Sess. tit. 11(1976). 
41. H.R. 1990, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). There have also been subsequent proposals to 
H.R. 1990. See, e.g., H.R. 379. IOOth Cong .• 1st Sess. (1987); S. 791. 1000h Cong .• 1st 
Sess. (1987); H.R. 902. 10 I st Cong., lst Sess. (1989). 
42. See Brown, Overview, supra note 2, at 1397-98. Substantial parts of the remainder of 
this Article are adapted, expanded or borrowed from Part V of that article. 
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Proponents of the new version of design protection43 argue that the elim-
ination of any reference to ornamentality is of no real significance. 
Consider the views of William S. Thompson, counsel for Caterpillar, Inc., 
who is, perhaps, the most persistent advocate of this new version. In response 
to the comments of the Register of Copyrights, Ralph Oman, made after Sen-
ate hearings in 1987 on the new bill, (0 the effect that the elimination of "orna-
mental" seriously altered the direction of the bill, Mr. Thompson made the 
extraordinary statement that when the Willis Bill of 1957 defined "ornamen-
tal designs" as "attractive, artistic or distinctive," "the base requirement was 
that the design be distinctive and that was the interpretation given the orna-
mentality definition." Mr. Thompson further asserted that "[t]he inclusion 
[by the Register] of the aesthetic criteria deviates from the 30-year history of 
this legislation. .,. It was never there. ,,44 Mr. Thompson's statement that 
"ornamental" means only "distinctive" is questionable; such a characteriza-
tion flies in the face of both the dictionary and of common sense. 
In the version of the bill which almost became Title II of the 1976 Copy-
right Revision, "distinctive" was changed to "distinct," a modification that 
caused the biII to lose both strength and context. Similarly, the definition of 
"ornamental" was modified to "attractive or distinct in appearance, ,,45 
although no reason can be adduced to suppress "attractive" and leave only 
"distinct" as the controlling term. Professor Fryer, in the only detailed analy-
sis of the new version hitherto published, also attempts to subordinate "attrac-
tive" and seemingly is opposed to having any artistic element in the law "simi-
lar to the 'ornamental' requirement in design patent law.'t46 Professor Fryer 
states that "[o]thers consider the 'attractive' and 'distinctive' terms adequate 
to define any product design that can be recognized. ,,47 
These very limited views ignore the goal of thirty years of draftsmen, 
sponsors, and witnesses48 to enact a bill that would protect "ornamental 
designs of useful articles." That is what all the bills were called. The word 
"ornamental" was, one would suppose, chosen because it paralleled the 
design patent language. 
It appears that the old bill, that is, the bill which almost became"Title II 
of the 1976 Copyright Revision, simply and neatly took the word "ornamen-
tal" from the design patent statute because it had a fairly well-developed 
43. The bills before Congress in 1990 were H.R. 902, H.R. 3017, and H.R. 3499, IOlst 
Cong .• 1st Sess. (1989). They were alike as to essentials and most details. 
44. W.S. Thompson, Comments and Proposed Amendments in Response to the Statement of 
Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman to Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents. 
Copyrights and Trademarks, RE: S. 791. May 12. 1987, at I. This significant docu-
ment is not part of the 1987 printed Hearings. 
45. S. 22. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. II, § 201 (1976). reprinted in CASES ON COPYRIGHT 143 
(R. Brown & R. Denicola ed. Supp. 1990). 
46. Fryer. Industrial Design. supra note 13. at 217. 
47.ld. 
48. See. e.g .• /960 Hearing. supra note 16. at 60-66 (important testimony of Register Fisher 
in 1960. making innumerable references to "ornamental" designs). 
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meaning49 and was entirely consistent with the aspirations of the supporters 
of design legislation for more than a generation. The old "ornamental" bill 
relieved designers of the patent law obligation of establishing inventiveness. 
and, having accomplished that, it establishes a modest level of novelty. Both 
the old .and new bills50 deny protection for designs that are "staple or com-
monplace, such as a standard geometric figure, familiar symbol, emblem, 
or motif, or other shape, pattern, or configuration which has become com-
mon, prevalent, or ordinary; [and) different from a design excluded ... 
above only in iJ.lsignificant details or in elements which are variants com-
monly used in the relevant trades."st 
These passages are full of words and phrases which require definition 
through experience and litigation. While 1 am not aware of any objection to 
their appropriateness, it is clear that some advocates of the new bills are try-
ing to legislate something quite different from the focus of earlier efforts. It 
is, of course, disingenuous to assert that a dozen earlier bills did not mean 
what they said. There is not, ,moreover, a firm party line on the extirpation 
of any pleasing or artistic elements as criteria for protection in the bill. 
During the 1988 hearing, a witness from General Motors, trying to obtain 
protection for automobile body parts, explained that the legislation repre-
sented "an effort to afford limited but reasonable protection in the United 
States for investment in creating useful, aesthetic, and innovative designs." 
Elsewhere in his brief statement, he referred twice to the "artistic aspects" 
of exterior panels as deserving protection. 52 
At this point, it may be helpful to illustrate how any design law would 
confer protection which is not now available (except, in some cases, through 
trade dress recognition), and then to determine what else the new bills are 
trying to achieve and whether that goal is appropriate. 
As a copyright-like measure, the first accomplishment of all versions 
would be to wipe out the separability requirement currently imbedded in the 
copyright law. The lighting fixtures in Esquire. Inc. v. Ringer,s3 the manne-
quins in Carol Barnhart. Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp .. 54 the wire wheel hub-
caps in Norris Industries. Inc. v. International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corp .• 6s and the bicycle rack in Brandir International. Inc. v. Cascade 
49. See Mott, The Standard of Ornamentality in the United States Design Patent Law. 48 
A.B.A. J. 548, 643 (1962) (note that this two-part article was prepared at a time of 
intense interest in design legislation). 
50. H.R. 1900, 99th Cong .• 1st Sess. § l002(b)-(c) (1985). 
51. Id. 
52. Protection of Industrial Designs of Useful Articles: Hearing on H.R. I I 79 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts. Civil Liberties. and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary. looth Cong .. 2d Sess. 87 (1988) (statement of Kenneth Enborg. represent-
ing the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association). 
53. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 440 U.S. 908 (1979). 
54. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1980). 
55. 696 F.2d 918 (llthCir.), cen. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983). 
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Pacific Lumber Co. 56 all failed the separability test, yet they would easily 
pass either as ornamental or industrial designs of useful objects. 
An inquiry regarding the prospects for failed design patents brings to 
mind Stiffel's pole lamp in Sears57 and Day-Brite's fluorescent light fixtures 
in Compco. 58 They would probably both gain design protection. The tweez-
ers-with-a-Iight in Nalbandian,59 however, were, in my view, on the margin 
of "variants .commonly used. ,,60 
A persisting problem in all versions since 1976 is a shift to the word 
"distinct" instead of "distinctive." "Distinctive" supplies a rich and rele-
vant context from trademark law. Distinctiveness in the 'trademark sense, 
though sufficient, would not be a necessary condition of protection. The 
bills may properly say that either attractiveness or distinctiveness will make 
a design ornamental. Distinctiveness is a valid criterion because it has posi-
tive content. The American Heritage Dictionary, in its discussion of the syn-
onymsof "characteristic," states that "distinctive" adds the idea of "an out-
standing, worthwhile quality or feature. ,,6 I "Distinctive" is defined as 
"serving to identify." "Distinct" means only "not identical" or "not simi-
lar. ,,62 
This is not word-juggling; the apologists for the new bills are 
attempting to shift its whole emphasis to "distinct," meaning only, I think, 
"recognizable." They are doing this for a purpose that will shortly be 
unfolded. 
There is one constraint on the generous reach of both the old and new 
bills that must be mentioned, namely, the exclusion of a design "dictated 
solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it.,,63 Function-
ality is a morass which cannot be circumvented, whether the approach to 
design is by patent, copyright, trade dress, or the proposed design registra-
tion now under examination. Without slogging through the whole morass, 
it is enough to say that design legislation is more tolerant of incidental pro-
tection of functional aspects than is copyright or trade dress law. 
Copyright denies protection to the useful aspects of useful articles both 
on policy and administrative grounds. Utility, as we were firmly instructed 
in the great case of Baker v. Seiden,64 is the domain of patent law. Monopo-
lies in useful articles are jealously guarded: they are hard to get and are 
short-lived. Copyrights, on the other hand, are for artists, not artisans. 
56. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
57. 376 US. 225 (1964). 
58. 376 US. 234 (1964). 
59. 661 F.2d 1214. 1215 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
60. Excluded from protection in H.R. 1990. 99th ~ong .• 1st Sess. § IOO2(c) (1985). 
61. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OFTHE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 226 (1969). 
62. [d. at 383. 
63. H.R. 1990. 99th Cong .• 1st Sess. § IOO2(d)(1985). 
64. 101 US. 99 (1880). 
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They are easy to get and long-lived. Even if the Copyright Office was not 
barred from the world of utility by history and policy, it could not cope with 
it. As we observed in Mazer v. Stein,65 the design door may be opened too 
wide. The Copyright Office has not only closed it most of the way, but it 
was deeply involved in the drafting of the old design bill through Arthur 
Fisher, the outstanding Register who unleashed Mazer v. Stein, and his able 
successors, Abraham Kaminstein, George Cary, and Barbara Ringer,66 who 
each desired a statute for ornamental designs of useful articles because they 
felt that regular copyright was unsuitable for their protection. 
Trade dress law, as we have seen,67 is struggling with the concept offunc-
tionality. Judges who wield the sharp sword of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
are sensitive (though sometimes less than they should be) about conferring the 
equivalent of perpetual patents611 in the guise of trade dress protection. 
One kind of functionality barrier to trade dress protection, though of 
diminishing recognition, is "aesthetic functionality," which encourages the 
view that if elements of appearance were "an important ingredient of the 
commercial success of the product," then they should be open to imita-
tors. 69 Whatever the merits of this view, it has no place in a design law 
since pleasing appearance is precisely the subject of design protection. 
Consideration must next be given to whether the new design bills suf-
ficiently fend off conferring protection of ordinary functionality-the useful 
aspects of the useful article. It is necessary to recall that the procedures uti-
lized involve no search or appraisal of inventiveness. Furthermore, the func-
tionality barrier to design protection is a thin one; a design is excluded only if 
it is "dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it. ,,70 
One must wonder whether many consciously contrived designs do 
respond solely to utilitarian functions. The Copyright Office was troubled 
by this query, as evidenced by its March 1987 statement: "In the experience 
of the Copyright Office when registering applied designs, virtually no 
designs are dictated solely by a utilitarian function.'t7J 
It is noteworthy that design patent law distinguishes between design 
and function in that courts reject design patents if they are "primarily 
65. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
66. See Industrial Innovation and Technology Act: Hearing on S. 791 Before the Subcomm. on 
Patents. Copyrights. and Trademarks 0 the Senate Comm. on the Judicicry. 1000h Cong., 
1st Sess. 23, 25 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Hearing) (Letter from Judge Giles Rich to Con-
gressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, Apr. 20, 1976). 
67. See supra no~c;,,25-35...and.accomnamtinl!..tex t. 
68. There is no durationallimit on protection under § 43(a). 
69. The quoted phrase is from the leading case on aesthetic functionality, Pagliero v. Wal-
lace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) (floral designs on dinner plates were 
what attracted customers; no trade dress protection). The "diminished recognition" of 
this doctrine is canvassed in Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co .• 832 F.2d 513, 517-21 
(10th Cir. 1987). 
70. H.R. 1900, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § IOO2(d) (1985). 
71. 1987 Hearing. supra note 66, at 243-44. 
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functional."72 Although this is not a bright line test, it does offer some 
degree of guidance. One good example of the application of the "primarily 
functional" test by the Federal Circuit is found in its recent decision, Power 
Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc. 73 In that case, the court denied a request 
for a preliminary injunction by the "inventor" of a plastic container for an 
electric dimmer switch, finding that the container followed precisely the 
contours of the switch that it enclosed, and was, therefore, "primarily func-
tional" rather than "primarily ornamental.,,74 
This further instance of needed textual tinkering brings us closer to the 
promised realistic question: what are the new bills seeking that the old bill 
did not offer? Based upon statements made at public hearings (although one 
cannot be confident that there are no hidden agendas) two major movements 
for protection are apparent. First, there is a forceful movement by the orig-
inal equipment manufacturers to retain control of the billion-dollar market 
for automobile "crash parts,,7s-those exterior parts which are easy to 
crumple and costly to restore. Crash parts have become easy to copy, and 
the impact of lower-priced competition has led to cries for help. 
The other major movement for protection is by Caterpillar regarding 
the innards of its massive machines. Caterpillar'S able spokesman, William 
S. Thompson, focused his remarks at the 1987 hearings on a fuel injection 
nozzle. The only nonfunctional feature of the nozzle is a distinctive "inden-
tation in the casing," and even that feature is described as being "caused by 
the manufacturing process."76 Mr. Thompson explained that a competitor, 
who omits the indentation on the nozzle, or even varies the labeling and 
packaging, could not be checked even under the new bills. After presenting 
labeling and packaging variants that concededly infringed upon Caterpil-
lar's registered trademarks, Mr. Thompson urged the legislators to take 
appropriate remedial measures to protect the design itself. 77 
Both the crash parts and working parts' spokespersons are assisted by a 
quirk in the definition of "useful article." Both bills state that "[a]n article 
which normally is a part of a useful article shall be deemed to be a useful 
article. ,,78 This definition requires clarification, as the Copyright Office 
72. Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1968). c:ert. denied. 393 u.s. 
1031 (1969). 
73. 806 F.ld 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
74. Power Controls. 806 F.2d at 240. Design patents sometimes issue and are then invali-
dated (for want of ornamentality) on articles that are concealed in use. A vivid example 
is a septic tank. See C & M Fiberglass Septic Tanks. Inc. v. T & N Fiberglass Mfg. Co .• 
214 U.S.P.Q. (DNA) 159 (D. S.C. 1981). In such cases the patentee is probably trying to 
capture some functional attribute. 
75. See, e.g., 1987 Hearing, supra note 66. at 90 (testimony of Jean Hiestand. Vice President 
and General Counsel. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.). 
76. 1987 Hearing, supra note 66. 
77. 1d. at 39. 
78. S. 22. 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. tit. II. § 201(b)(I) (1976) (old bill); H.R. 1900. 99th Cong .• 
1st Sess. § 100I(b)(I) (1985) (new bill). 
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suggested, so as to leave no doubt that a part, as well as the whole, must 
qualify as not entirely functional and as attractive or distinctive. 79 
Another dimension of both bills-the standard-setting procedures-
requires further clarification. Section 2 of both the old and new versions of 
the bill excludes (a) designs not originating from the designer (embracing 
the copyright concept of originality); (b) staple or commonplace designs; (c) 
those differing from (b) exclusions only in insignificant details or common 
variants; and (d) the solely functional exclusion. 8o Section 3 of the old and 
new bills then rehabilitates a design excluded under (b) through (d) if it con-
stitutes "a substantial revision, adaptation, or rearrangement of said subject 
matter. ,,81 
Professor Fryer makes a brave attempt to explain what section 3 (which 
has been neglected) might mean. He points out quite sensibly that most 
designs, like most intellectual creations, will include elements which are 
functional, and others which are commonplace, and that as the designer 
rearranges and adds to these elements, a protectable design emerges. 82 
While this is certainly so, one must question whether this complexity is nec-
essary. It might suffice for section 2 to simply start out by saying: "Protec-
tion under this chapter shall not be available for elements of a design which 
fall within subsections (a) through (d)." In that case, all of section 3 would 
be dispensable, including its elaborate proviso that a designer without con-
sent cannot copy subject matter protected by copyright or patent. Perhaps 
there is an inwardness to section 3 beyond this author's comprehension. 
IV. KEEPING DESIGN AND COPYRIGHT SEPARATE: 
CUMULATION PROBLEMS 
If comprehensive design legislation is achieved, it must be asked 
whether it is appropriate to continue to offer full copyright protection for 
those designs which can meet the copyright test of separability. The new 
bills permit copyright and design protection to coexist, thereby, avoiding 
the three main arguments for comprehensive design legislation.83 
79. 1987 Hearing. supra note 66, at 245. This concern responds to rather cloudy sugges-
tions made by Thompson. 1987 Hearing. supra note 66, and Fryer, Industrial Design. 
supra note 13, at 215-19. that parts of useful objects can be protected as long as they are 
recognizable and even if they are wholly functional. Would registration be required for 
each part in which protection is claimed? Caterpillar stocks 450.000 parts! See 1987 
Hearing. supra note 66, at 39. 
The definition of useful article in § 101 of the Copyright Act is identical. including 
_the..'.'.par:to.Ca useful article" sentence, but that definition serves a very different purpose. 
It is linked to the restriction of protection of useful articrestlIm: is a central policy-ef=ttre-
Copyright Act. Here it is attempted to be turned to enlarging protection. 
80. s. 22, 94th Cong .• 2d Sess. tit. II, § 202 (1976) (old bill); H.R. 1900, 99th Cong .• 1st 
Sess. § 1002 (1985) (new bill). 
81. s. 22. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. II, § 203 (1976) (old bill); H.R. 1900. 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 1003 (1985) (new biJI). 
82. Fryer, Industrial Design. supra note 13, at 217-19. 
83. See. e.g., H.R. 3499. Wist Cong., 1st Sess. § 23 (1989). 
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Argument one asserts that large categories of deserving designs are 
now unprotected. Argument two is that copyright is both too easy to get 
and confers too long a term (seventy-five years). Argument three is that, 
since copyright protection as it exists today only partially serves the public 
interest in encouraging the creation of pleasing designs, a scheme of encour-
agement for all pleasing designs ought to suffice for alfdesigners. 
All kinds of designers, even if they are not in competition with one 
another, ought to be treated equally, unless some ground exists for a varia-
tion in treatment. No persuasive reason comes to mind why designers of 
textile fabrics, for example, can get copyright, with its minimal level of 
required creativity, its casual registration requirements, and its extended 
duration, while designers of modern lighting fixtures would have to show 
that their designs are not "staple or commonplace," would have to register to 
gain protection, and then would enjoy only a ten-year term of protection 
(which this author believes is quite long enough). 
A clean separation should be made by amending the Copyright Act to 
exclude designs of useful objects. This could be accomplished by cutting 
off the definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works in section 101 
after providing for "works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but 
not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned."84 Then, it would 
be necessary to deal with section 113, which, as it stands today, constitutes 
an embarrassment to all concerned because of its increasingly outdated ref-
erence in subsection (b) to the law "in effect on December 31, 1977."85 
Section 113 could be modified to state only that "the exclusive right to 
reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in or on the 
design of a useful article is governed by chapter 10 of this title," assuming 
that chapter 10 would. at that time. be the appropriate reference. 
Certainly. there exist drafting problems with regard to sections 10 I and 
84. The provision for "works of artistic craftsmanship" first came in by a regulation in 1949. 
There was only limited experience with the regulation as such before it was swallowed 
up by the capacious maw of Mazer. See Milch. Protection for Utilitarian Works of Art: 
The Design Patent Copyright Conundrum. 10 COLUM. lL. & ARTS 211 (1986) (extensive 
consideration of full copyright protection for works of artistic craftsmanship combined 
with short-term design protection for useful objects). 
85. Section I J3 provides in part: 
(a) Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section. the exclu-
sive right- to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial. graphic. or sculptural work in 
copies under section 106 includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any 
kind of article. whether useful or otherwise. 
(b) This title does not afford. to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a 
useful article as such. any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making. 
distribution. or display_ of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to 
such works under the law. whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a 
State. in effect on December 31. 1977. as held applicable and construed by a 
court in an action brought under this title. 
17 U.S.C. § 113 (a)-(b) (1988). 
Section 113(c) is a harmless privilege to reproduce pictures of such copyrighted 
works in advertisements. commentaries. and news reports. 
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113 which I have not adequately resolved. I hope, however, that an intention 
to elimin(ite useful articles altogether from the application of ordinary copy-
right law is made clear. Indeed, it was the goal of the Copyright Office dur-
ing its first major push· to achieve design legislation in 1960 to eliminate 
such useful articles from copyright. Interests favoring copyright, notably 
Disney, with its priceless stable of animated animals, however, mounted an 
outcry and caused the Copyright Office to make a slow retreat from the 
principle of keeping the two realms of protection separate. 86 
What the Copyright Office now proposes is not an exclusion of the 
design of useful articles from copyright but an election. The Copyright 
Office refers to the old bill as it existed just prior to the fall of 1985, which 
would amend section 113 to include, among other things, the following lan-
guage: "Protection under chapters 1 through 8 of this title of a work in 
which copyright subsists shall terminate with respect to its utilization. in 
useful articles whenever the copyright proprietor has obtained registration 
of an ornamental design of a useful article. embodying said work."87 
, There will always be those who will be timorous about any binding 
election. It is conceivable that, even after registration, a design might fail 
because it is unoriginal or commonplace. But, if the design has such.flaws, 
it does not deserve copyright protection. If the designer still believes that 
he or she has a valid separable copyright, he or she can defend that copy-
right. 
My complaint with the election process is that it is too indulgent. 
Designs of useful articles should be outside the realm of copyright. All 
designs should be treated equally. 
As for design patent, there appears to have been agreement from the 
beginning that the achievement of a· design patent would terminate a copy-
right registered design.88 With this procedure, there is also a risk: the 
design patent might be held invalid under circumstances in which a regis-
tered design would flourish. The designer does not have to take that risk, 
however, if he or she will be content with the registered design. It is, of 
course, entirely speculative· whether design patents would or should, con-
tinue to exist once a registered design scheme was in place. 89 
v. CONCLUSION 
This Article has· trudged about in a s~all corner of the law; it needs no 
elaborate recapitulation. AI~hough the area is small, it is troubled. The 
diversity of interests and geography gathered for the 1989 conference evi-
86. The complicated story can be picked out from Reichman, Design Protection in Copyright 
Law, supra note I, at 1187,. 1192, 1196, 1200. . 
87. 1987 Hearing •. supra note 66, at 209. 
88. H.R. 1900, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1028(b) (1985). 
89. In 1966, a Presidential Commission recommended that design patent be abandoned if 
another form of design protection came into being. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON 
TIlE PATENT SYSTEM, REPORT 12-13 (1.966). 
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dences the need for legislative (or other) solutions to the difficulties experi-
enced by designers. Extensive protection may be the answer for designers, 
but it is not necessarily in the interest of the consuming public which does 
not benefit from being forced to purchase a product from a sole source. 90 
There has long been a legislative model which has one vital shortcom-
ing: it cannot win the support of Congress. The last three years of activity 
have focused on a troubling variation on that model-one that seems to ask 
more of Congress than it did before. When reviewing all of the verbiage 
and rationalizations, we discover two new powerful claimants for protec-
tion, along with the familiar furniture makers and leather designers: the 
automobile manufacturers seeking monopolies on the external parts they 
manufacture, and the heavy equipment people who seek monopolies on the 
production of their necessary internal parts. 
Congressman Kastenmeier, a true statesman in this field, recently sug-
gested a fourfold test that any intellectual property proposal should have to 
meet. 91 Although all four of his propositions are pertinent to the design 
problem, one in particular requires special attention. Congressman Kasten-
meier suggests that "the proponent of change should present an honest anal-
ysis of all the costs and benefits of the proposed legislation." He explains 
that "[t]he argument that a particular interest group will make more money 
and therefore be more creative does not satisfy this threshold standard or the 
constitutional requirements of the intellectual property clause ... 92 Adher-
ence to tenets like these is more important than whether the statute uses the 
word "ornamental. .. 93 
Extensive protection may be the answer for designers, but it is not nec-
essarily in the interest of the consuming public. Nevertheless, ·when one 
places the case for limited protection for the ornamental design of useful 
objects in the context of other limited monopolies in intellectual property, 
the case is not an unreasonable one. 
90. It is worth noting that in the past the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice rou-
tinely recorded its opposition to design legislation. 
91. Kastenmeier & Remington. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp 
or Firm Ground? 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 440 (1985). 
92. [d. at 441. 
93. If "ornamental" has become a disfavored term. and since "industrial" has too strong a 
suggestion of functionality protection. perhaps a neutral word might be acceptable. 
Why not call the bill one to provide for protection of the appearance design of useful 
articles? 
